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The Book of Mormon Sheds
Valuable Light on the Ancient
Israelite Law of False Prophecy1
David W. Warby

The Book of Mormon sheds valuable light on the textual
interpretation of the ancient Israelite law of false prophecy.
For many centuries Rabbis have defined false prophecy as the
inaccurate prediction of the future and have punished it as a
capital offense. 2 However, during the twentieth century, two
scholars, Moses Buttenwieser and Peter C. Craigie, proposed
that the biblical text supports an alternative definition of a
false prophet: one who advocates false doctrine or divinely
forbidden action. 3 A close examination of Book of Mormon
trials reveals that the Nephites-themselves an ancient
Israelite group-likely applied this alternative doctrinal interpretation in their courts, and in some cases, may have used
both definitions.
The crime of false prophecy derives from Deuteronomy
18:20, which states that "the prophet, which shall presume to
speak a word in my name, which I have not commanded him
to speak, or that shall speak in the name of other gods, even
that prophet shall die." Deuteronomy 18:21-22 sets forth the
method for determining if a prophet is false: "And if thou say
in thine heart, How shall we know the word which the Lord
hath not spoken? When a prophet speaketh in the name of
the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the
thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet hath
spoken it presumptuously: Thou shalt not be afraid of him."
W. W ARBY obtained his JD. from Brigham Young University,
J Reuben Clark Law School, in 1982. He practiced law in Washington
state for thirteen years and now teaches Special Education at
Marysville-Pi/chuck High School in Marysville, Washington.
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The rabbinic interpretation of this scripture makes the
crime virtually unenforceable for lack of a standard stating
how long a court would have to wait to determine that the
prophecy could never be fulfilled. The Rabbis further diluted
the law by saying that only prophecies of blessings could
prove a prophet false because failure of cataclysmic prophecies
could be the result of repentance. Therefore, the rabbinic
reading would only permit conviction of false prophets
who prophesied blessings the court somehow concluded
could never come to pass. Reason suggests either that the
Lord intended the capital offense to be more enforceable than
the rabbinic interpretation allows or that the definition of the
crime itself has changed.
In 1914, Moses Buttenwieser said he would translate
Deuteronomy 18:22 as identifying the false prophet by his
speaking "in the name of YHWH that which shall not be or
occur," 4 meaning a false prophet is one who tells people to do
that which the Lord has forbidden. In 1976, Peter C. Craigie,
with a much less detailed analysis, similarly concluded: "The
Hebrew rendered literally is 'the word is not.' ... That is, the
word has no substance, or that what the prophet says simply
'is not so.' That is, the word supposedly spoken by God
through the prophet was not in accord with the word of God
already revealed and it was therefore automatically suspect." 5
Despite Buttenwieser's extensive analysis, he can cite only
one historical trial as precedent to refute the centuries-old
tradition of the Rabbis. Buttenwieser centers his argument
around the trial of Jeremiah, which took place about 608 B.C.,
or about thirteen years after the rediscovery of the
Deuteronomic law (see 2 Chronicles 34:14; 2 Kings 22:8).
This precedent is very weak, for Buttenwieser requires us to
assume as fact the widely debated theory that Jeremiah stood
trial for the crime of false prophecy and that a transcription
error converted a conviction into an acquittal. Therefore, it is
no wonder the rabbinic interpretation still receives common
acceptance. 6
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This paper examines Book of Mormon precedent almost
certainly unknown to Buttenwieser or Craigee. Approximately
seven years after the trial of Jeremiah (or some twenty-one
years after the rediscovery of the Deuteronomic law), the
prophet Lehi risked the lives of his sons to bring the law of
Moses with him from J eruselem to what would eventually be
called America (see 1 Nephi 1-5).
About 100 B.C., the wicked King Noah, a descendant of
Lehi who ruled over an isolated group of these new world
Israelites, maintained a court of hand-picked, corrupt priests.
One of his subjects, Abinadi, prophesied that doom would
befall the king and his priests for their wickedness. He was
brought before the king and his priests for questioning, "that
they might cross him, that thereby they might have wherewith
to accuse him" (Mosiah 12:29). The priests responded civilly
to Abinadi despite his stinging accusations until Abinadi said
what the king took as a capital offense. At this point King
Noah abruptly cut off Abinadi's discourse to command his
priests, "Away with this fellow, and slay him; for what have
we to do with him, for he is mad" (Mosiah 13:1).
Insanity was never a Hebrew crime. In fact, the insane
could probably expect support from the community. 7
However, the King James Version of the Bible translates the
Hebrew term mesugga as referring to someone who is "mad."
One scholar states that although the Hebrew word mesugga
literally means "one that is insane," it was applied anciently to
false prophets "because they boasted that they were under a
divine impulse, when they spoke their own thoughts." 8 Thus
Hosea said his critics considered him mesugga, or "mad"
(Hosea 9:7). The same Hebrew word was similarly used to
scorn the young prophet that Elisha sent to anoint Jehu king
of Israel (2 Kings 9:11). The false prophet Shemiah similarly,
but inaccurately, reproved the high priest in Jeruselem for
not punishing Jeremiah as a "man who is mad [mesugga],
and maketh himself a prophet" Geremiah 29:26). Another
commentator said of this designation:
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Language of this type is frequently used by the establishment
to characterize peripheral prophets whose claims are not
accepted. The symptoms of spirit possession are capable of
being understood either as an indication of genuine intermediation or as a sign of mental illness. The latter evaluation
indicates that the society refuses to recognize the possessed
individual as a divine intermediary. 9
Thus, when King Noah angrily declared Abinadi worthy
of death because he was "mad," the king likely declared
Abinadi guilty of false prophecy. What did Abinadi say that
gave King Noah cause to think he had finally proven Abinadi
guilty of false prophecy?
Abinadi later said to the king and his priests, "Because I
have told you the truth ye are angry with me [but] because
I have spoken the word of God ye have judged me that I am
mad" (Mosiah 13:4). Abinadi had earlier made it clear that
God sent him, but that claim merely inflamed the court to
seek a crime with which to charge him. The reason for the
sudden verdict must therefore be found in the particular
content of Abinadi's message at the moment Noah cut him
off to order him executed.
We are blessed with a very accurate account of Abinadi's
conversation with Noah's court. Alma, one of the younger
judges who was expelled from the court for siding with
Abinadi, hid from Noah and recorded "all the words Abinadi
had spoken" (Mosiah 17:4). The accuracy of Alma's record is
shown by the fact that he quotes Abinadi's breaking off in
the middle of the second commandment when interrupted
by the guilty verdict (Mosiah 12:37), then his picking up midcommandment, where he had left off, when he continued
(Mosiah 13: 12).
When Noah interrupted Abinadi's message to declare him
"mad," the prophet had just recited the first commandment,
and half of the second, and had accused the court of neither
keeping the commandments nor teaching the people to keep
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them (see Mosiah 12:37). Much earlier in the discourse
Abinadi accused the court of violating another of the Ten
Commandments (see Mosiah 21:29). Abinadi also earlier had
mocked the priests for "claiming" to teach the law of Moses
(Mosiah 12:29-31). So what was new about Abinadi's message
that justified Noah's abrupt verdict?
Notice that Abinadi had switched roles when King
Noah interrupted him. In his earlier response to the priests'
question, Abinadi had played the part of a gadfly, probing
them concerning the law and rebuking them for not knowing
or teaching it. But, five verses before the verdict (see Mosiah
12:33), Abinadi became an instructor in the law, by stating
the eternal significance of the law, reciting the commandments,
and challenging the establishment's interpretation of them. In
this new role, Abinadi intended his words to be taken as
commentary on the law, and they were taken as such. And
since Abinadi's interpretation of the Mosaic law differed from
that which the court accepted, Noah perhaps felt he had spoken
"in the name of YHWH that which shall not be or occur,"
which Buttonweiser and Craigee said constitutes the crime of
false prophecy.
So although Abinadi's denunciation of their sins and his
prophecies of doom angered King Noah and his priests, they
still had to find "wherewith to accuse him." It was not until
Abinadi stepped into the role of an instructor in the law that
the king felt he could execute Abinadi for being a false
prophet, or for being "mad." This clearly indicates that at
least this ancient court based on Hebrew law, corrupt as it
was, applied the doctrinal test of a false prophet as
Buttonweiser and Craigee propose was intended, rather than
the failed prophecy test to which the Rabbis have adhered for
centuries.
We must now point out that Abinadi was ultimately
executed for a different crime than just discussed, one that
may well have fit the rabbinic prophetic definition of false
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prophecy. After divine intervention prevented the priests
from carrying out Noah's execution order and Abinadi finished
his message, he was returned to prison for three days before
Noah informs him, "We have found an accusation against
thee, and thou art worthy of death" (Mosiah 17:7). This second
verdict was based on Abinadi's response to the priests' original
question regarding the meaning of Isaiah's prophecy, which
Abinadi said meant "that God himself should come down
among the children of men" (Mosiah 17:8). It is important to
note that this part of Abinadi's discourse was not given until
long after Noah declared Abinadi "mad." Why Noah may
have been prevented from executing Abinadi when he first
ordered it for his being "mad" are beyond the scope of this
paper. 10 For our present purposes we need merely point out
that the two charges were clearly separate from each other.
The record fails to inform us of the precise nature of this
second crime for which Abinadi was ultimately executed. At
first blush, this second charge appears to be a good example of
false prophecy by the rabbinic failed prophecy definition.
Noah indicated that the death sentence was imposed because
Abinadi said that "God himself should come down among the
children of men," clearly a prophetic utterance. However,
the court obviously had no intention of waiting to see if the
prophecy would be fulfilled. If the priests felt that God's coming
to Earth was too preposterous to ever happen, this final
charge may have been one of false prophecy, based on
prophetic utterance rather than doctrine. However, using the
same reasoning, the second charge may just as well have been
one of blasphemy.
A second Book of Mormon trial strongly supports the
Buttonweisser/Craigee doctrinal interpretation of the ancient
Israelite law of false prophecy. About seventy-five years after
Abinadi's trial, Nephi 2, who had resigned as chief judge to
preach repentance, arose from his tower prayer to confront a
crowd that had gathered to listen to him. Only a small fraction
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of Nephi's discourse is preserved in our record, but we are
told that because "Nephi had spoken unto them concerning
the corruptness of their law" (Helaman 8:3), wicked judges
demanded the people "bring him forth, that he may be condemned ... for his crime ... [of] revil[ing] against this people
and ... our law" (Helaman 8:1-2). Although the record describes Nephi's supposed crime as one of "reviling the law," it
seems logical that Nephi may have been charged with false
prophecy, since Israelite law incorporated doctrine into the
criminal code (as shown by the law of false prophecy).
Nephi's accusations that the doctrinally centered law had
been corrupted could hardly be taken as anything less than
preaching false doctrine by those who advocated (and enforced)
a contrary view of the law.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Nephi's trial is that
although the judges were quick to condemn Nephi as a false
prophet for his doctrinal disputes with them, they apparently did not even view prophesying the future as possible,
let alone as a test of a prophet. Nephi defended himself first
by reminding the people that God had helped other prophets
foretell the future and then by providing them with a dramatic,
immediately verifiable, example: he foretold the murder of
their chief judge and the method by which the chief judge's
brother would confess the crime (see Helaman 8:27; 9:25-37).
That Nephi perceived a need to remind his accusers that God
had helped other prophets foretell the future appears to this
author as strong evidence that the prediction of future events
was not the criteria the accusers were then applying to judge
him. Thus, Nephi's trial appears not only to support the
Buttonweisser/Craigee doctrinal interpretation of the law of
false prophecy, but to refute the alternative rabbinic interpretation based on foretelling the future.
The Book of Mormon trial of Alma and Amulek similarly,
but less forcefully, supports the Buttonweisser/Craigee reading
of the law of false prophecy. The charge of "reviling against the
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law" was raised against Amulek in particular, not only by the
angry crowd (Alma 14:1-2), but at his arraignment before the
chief judge (see Alma 14:4-5), and even after his and Alma's
imprisonment and the burning of their followers (see Alma
14:20). All the arguments stated above in relation to Nephi's
trial apply with equal force to Amulek's, leading to the conclusion that Amulek was also likely tried for false prophecy.
As with Abinadi and Nephi, the court was far more concerned with doctrinal rather than prophetic issues.
We have thus far only considered trials of righteous
prophets by corrupt courts. Let us now consider what little
the record provides regarding trials of actual false prophets by
righteous courts, to see if the rules appear the same.
Unfortunately, our record of the only two such trials does
not provide much detail.
The first false prophet tried by a righteous judge was
Sherem, who is never directly quoted as speaking for God,
but who played the role of a prophet by professing a belief in
the scriptures (see Jacob 7: 10), seeking out the spiritual leader
Gacob) to debate doctrine (see Jacob 7:3), and accusing him of
perverting the law of Moses (see Jacob 7:7). Although Jacob
disputed doctrine with Sherem, no legal action was initiated,
and judgment was left in the hands of God.
The second false prophet tried by a righteous court was
Nehor, who preached what "he termed the word of God"
(Alma 1:3). Several of Nehor's doctrines clearly contradicted
those commonly accepted (see Alma 1:4), and the record
clearly states that his followers taught "false doctrines" after his
death (Alma 1:16). However, Nehor apparently never would
have been prosecuted but for his murder of a man during a
doctrinal dispute (Alma 1:9). After Nehor's execution for
murder, his followers were free to preach false doctrines so long
as they did not lie but instead "pretended to preach according to
their belief ... [for] the law could have no power on any man
for his belief" (Alma 1: 17).
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Neither of these anti-Christs seems to have claimed divine
authority in the same way as real prophets, by claiming to
bring a specific message commissioned of God. It appears they
may have done nothing worse than dispute known scriptures.
This may be the reason they were never prosecuted for false
prophecy. Another explanation might be that they were merely
disputing doctrine as opposed to "reviling the law," which may
indicate a false prophecy charge could arise from attacking the
law of performances but not from attacking doctrine.
In summary, we find little if any evidence in the Book of
Mormon that unfulfilled prophetic utterances about future
events were used to judge a prophet false. Instead, we find
Nephi having to convince his accusers that God can foretell
the future and then using a short-term, verifiable prophecy as
a defense. In the one clear example of a prophet (Abinadi)
being judged false (mad), the court found the crime to be his
challenging, in the name of God, his accusers' understanding
of divine law. The Book of Mormon contains other examples
in which it appears that courts applied doctrinal tests to judge
prophets false. Therefore, we conclude that ancient Nephite
courts likely applied the Buttonweisser/Craigee doctrinal test
of false prophecy instead of the rabbinic failed prophecy test.

Notes
1. This paper was originally written under the title of "The
Book of Mormon Reveals the Forgotten Law of False Prophecy" by
David W. Warby for Law 695R, "Ancient Legal Systems and the
Scriptures," under the supervision of Professor John Welch, fall
1981, BYU J. Reuben Clark Law School. Much of that original
work was incorporated into a paper entitled "The Crime of False
Prophecy under Ancient Israelite Law" by Lisa Bolin Hawkins and
David W. Warby, published by FARMS in 1983. This version was
prepared for presentation at the FARMS Symposium on Hebrew
Law in the Book of Mormon, 24 February 2001.
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